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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JASON LEE NIEMAN,  )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 12-3104
)
VERSUSLAW, INC., JOSEPH W. )
ACTON, YAHOO!, INC., GOOGLE )
INC., and MICROSOFT, CORP., )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the Report and
Recommendation (d/e 39) entered by Magistrate Judge David G.
Bernthal on June 13, 2012.  Plaintiff filed “Plaintiff’s Objections to the
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation (In Favor of Dismissal of All
Causes In This Action)” (Objections) (d/e 40) on June 14, 2012.  See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).  
The Report and Recommendation recommends granting
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Defendants’ various motions to dismiss (see d/e 16, d/e 18, d/e 22, and
d/e 27) and dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint in its
entirety with respect to all Defendants.  This Court reviews de novo any
part of the Report and Recommendation that has been properly objected
to.  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).  For the reasons set forth below, the Court
overrules Plaintiff’s Objections and adopts Judge Bernthal’s Report and
Recommendation.
BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
The operative complaint in this matter is Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint at Law (Second Amended Complaint).  The Second
Amended Complaint brings claims against the following Defendants:
Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft); Versuslaw, Inc. (Versuslaw); Yahoo!, Inc.
(Yahoo); Google, Inc. (Google); and Joseph W. Acton (Acton).  In the
Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff brings suit for an alleged violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in addition to several other federal and state law
claims.  The claims arise from the following facts that Plaintiff has alleged
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in his Second Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff is an insurance claims industry professional with over 20
years of experience.  Between November 2009 and March 2011, Plaintiff
was involved in litigation against his former employer, Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) and several related
defendants.
In approximately January 2009, Plaintiff discovered that certain
Internet websites were linking copies of information related to the
litigation to Plaintiff’s name, such that a simple Internet browser search
for his name would provide immediate results that referenced one or
more of the filings or rulings in the active litigation.  According to
Plaintiff, rather than linking his name to significant rulings, such as
appellate decisions or even trial court summary judgment rulings, the
links included attachments to rulings on matters as common as a
stipulated motion to quash a subpoena.  Plaintiff has alleged that these
references were occurring by way of paid legal search websites such as
Lexis/Nexis.com, Justia.com, Leagle.com, and Versuslaw.com (and/or its
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related site, Findacase.com).  These entities secure the case information
and related documents by way of sites such as PACER and then “mirror”
them onto the Internet by way of their sites and servers.
Between January 2009 and the date of filing this action, Plaintiff
applied for one or more positions of employment.  Plaintiff believes that
the potential employers have performed Internet browser searches by way
of Google.com, Yahoo.com, or Bing.com, and found documents related to
litigation against his former employer Nationwide.  Plaintiff also believes
that the potential employers have used this information to disqualify him
from candidacy for the applied position or have shared this information
with others who have done so.  In other words, Plaintiff alleges he “has
been effectively ‘blacklisted’ as to employment opportunities due to the
ease at which these references appear pursuant to a simple name search,
and due to the unlawful acts of third parties who then use such
information to unlawfully disqualify” his candidacy.
Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint which brings the
following claims against Defendants: (1) claims under the Illinois Human
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Rights Act; (2) commercial misappropriation; (3) violation of § 1981 of
the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1981); (4) violation of the Lanham Act;
(5) intentional interference with current and prospective economic
advantage; (6) unjust enrichment /civil conspiracy; and (7) violations of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
B. Defendants’ Motions
Defendants have all brought Motions to Dismiss.  See d/e 16, d/e
18, and d/e 27.  Additionally, Defendants Microsoft and Yahoo have
brought a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts III, IV, VIII,
IX, and X of the Second Amended Complaint.1  See d/e 22.  All of the
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA).  All  Defendants also argue that,
even apart from the question of whether the CDA bars Plaintiff’s claims,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
1 On June 13, 2008, the same day Judge Bernthal issued the Report and
Recommendation, Microsoft and Yahoo filed a Corrected Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings (d/e 38) which included Count VI, which had been left out of the
original Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 
Page 5 of  29
C. Judge Bernthal’s Report and Recommendation 
and Plaintiff’s Objections Thereto 
As stated, Judge Bernthal has recommended that Defendants’
Motions d/e 16,18, 22, and 27 be granted for several reasons.  First,
Plaintiff’s litigation against Nationwide is a matter of public record and
the First Amendment creates a privilege to public matters contained in
the public record.  Second, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by § 230 of the
CDA (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).  Finally, the facts as Plaintiff has alleged
them do not support Plaintiff’s various statutory and common law claims.
On June 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed his Objections to the Report and
Recommendation.  Plaintiff argues that: (1) the First Amendment does
not protect Defendants, (2) Section 230 of the CDA does not bar
Plaintiff’s claims, and (3) Judge Bernthal erred in concluding that
Plaintiff failed to state any federal or state claims.
ANALYSIS
Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must
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provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).  That statement must
be sufficient to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and
its basis.  Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008);
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929, 940 (2007).  This means that (1) “the complaint
must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant ‘fair
notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’” and
(2) its allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to
relief, raising that possibility above a “speculative level.”  EEOC v.
Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.2007). 
While detailed factual allegations are not needed, a “formulaic recitation
of a cause of action's elements will not do.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
127 S.Ct. at 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d at 940.  Conclusory allegations are “not
entitled to be assumed true.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951,
173 L.Ed.2d 868, 885 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). 
“In ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the court must treat all well-pleaded
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allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving
party.”  In re marchFIRST Inc., 589 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is “designed to provide a
means of disposing of cases when the material facts are not in dispute
and a judgment on the merits can be achieved by focusing on the content
of the pleadings and any facts of which the court will take judicial
notice.”  All Amer. Inc. Co. v. Broeren Russo Const., Inc., 112 F. Supp.
2d 723, 728 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).  Rule 12(c)
permits judgment based on the pleadings alone, which include the
complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits. 
Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend,
163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998).  The court may also “take judicial
notice of documents that are part of the public record, including
pleadings, orders, and transcripts from the prior proceedings.” Hernandez
ex rel. Gonzalez v. Tapia, 2010 WL 5232942, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2010).  “A
motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same standard as a
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”  Medeiros v. Client Services, Inc.,
2010 WL 3283050, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2010), citing Piscotta v. Old Nat'l
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007).
1.  Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Are Granted Because 
Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Claim
a.  Counts I and III - Illinois Human Rights Act
Counts I and III are brought against Defendants and purport to
allege violations of the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), specifically,
775 ILCS 5/6-101(A) and/or (B).  In these Counts, Plaintiff alleges that
he has given Defendants notice that their actions, i.e., “publicizing the
Plaintiff’s protected conduct without justification[,] acts to aid and/or
abet those who would seek to retaliate or discriminate against the
Plaintiff for taking part in protected employment activities, and that their
continuing refusal to remove such references or links constitute
retaliation as to his prior protected conduct.” 
Section 6-101 of the IHRA provides that it is a civil rights violation
for a person, or two or more people to, conspire to “retaliate against a
person because he or she has opposed that which he or she reasonably
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and in good faith believes to be unlawful discrimination.”  775 ILCS 5/6-
101(A)).  It is also a violation of the IHRA to “[a]id, abet, compel or
coerce a person to commit any violation of [the IHRA].”  775 ILCS 5/6-
101(B)).
The elements of a claim for retaliation under the IHRA are that (1)
the employee was engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer
committed a material adverse act against him; and (3) a causal nexus
existed between the protected activity and the adverse act.  Hoffelt v.
Illinois Dept. Of Human Rights, 367 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634 (Ill. App. Ct.
2006).  Plaintiff has not stated a claim for any violation of the IHRA
where the allegations against Defendants are that they provided links to
public court documents involving litigation between Plaintiff and his
former employer and refused to remove the documents when requested
by Plaintiff.  Here, the Second Amended Complaint does not allege that
any of the Defendants are an employer or potential employer of Plaintiff,
nor does it allege that any of the Defendants have committed a material
adverse act against Plaintiff.  The allegations, which are assumed to be
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true for purposes of Defendants’ Motions, only establish that Defendants
provided access to public information that potential employers used to
deny Plaintiff employment.  This is not sufficient to state a claim under
the IHRA. 
b.  Counts II and IV - Commercial Misappropriation
Counts II and IV are state law claims for commercial
misappropriation.  These Counts allege that when Plaintiff’s name is
entered into one of the various Defendants’ (Google, Yahoo, or
Microsoft) search engines, a link appears to one of Defendant
Versuslaw’s websites.  When the link is “triggered”, the searching party is
steered to a page where the searching party can buy a copy of the
document for $4.95.  The Plaintiff alleges this is “misappropriating his
identity for commercial purposes.”
First, the Court notes that the Right of Publicity Act, effective
January 1, 1999, replaced the common-law tort of appropriation of
likeness.  Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, Ltd., 772 F. Supp.
2d 967, 972 (N.D. Ill. 2011); see also 765 ILCS 1075/60.  Section 30 of
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the Right of Publicity Act provides, “A person may not use an individual's
identity for commercial purposes during the individual's lifetime without
having obtained previous written consent . . . .”  765 ILCS 1075/30(a). 
The Right of Publicity Act defines “commercial purpose” as “public use
or holding out of an individual's identity (i) on or in connection with the
offering for sale or sale of a product, merchandise, goods, or services; (ii)
for purposes of advertising or promoting products, merchandise, goods, or
services; or (iii) for the purpose of fundraising.”  765 ILCS 1075/5. 
Moreover, section 35 of the Right of Publicity Act states that the Act
does not apply to the use of an individual’s identity for non-commercial
purposes, including any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or
account, or any political campaign.”
Here, Plaintiff has not stated a claim under the Right of Publicity
Act.  First, the exemption from liability for using a person’s identity for a
non-commercial purpose, including in a news or public affairs account is
applicable here.  Plaintiff’s prior litigation is a matter of public record and
public interest.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s identity is not being used for a
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“commercial purpose” as defined by the Right of Publicity Act because
his name is used only to find documents related to his case, which are
part of the public record.  His name is not being held out or used to
entice anyone to buy a product.  Under Plaintiff’s theory, every person
who is involved in litigation who has public court documents that can be
accessed for a fee on the Internet by doing a browser search or found by
using Westlaw, Lexis, Versuslaw, or any other legal research site can state
a claim under the Right of Publicity Act.  This cannot be the case.
c.  Counts V and VI - 42 U.S.C. § 1981
In Counts V and VI, Plaintiff attempts to allege a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1981.  In order to state a claim of discrimination under § 1981,
Plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a member of a racial minority; (2) the
defendants had the intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3)
the discrimination concerned the making or enforcing of a contract. 
Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2006).  Here,
Plaintiff has failed to allege any of these elements.  Plaintiff’s allegations
have nothing to do with discrimination based on race.  Nor do the
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allegations relate to the making or enforcing of a contract.  Therefore,
Plaintiff has not stated a claim under § 1981.
d.  Count VII - Lanham Act
Count VII is a claim under the Lanham Act against all Defendants. 
Plaintiff alleges that he has a “substantial property interest in his name”
and “the commercial use of his name is only expected to grow in the
future.”  Plaintiff further alleges Defendants Versuslaw and Acton are
attempting to associate Plaintiff with their for-profit website.  Plaintiff
accuses Defendants Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft of actively
participating in “these unlawful acts . . . by way of their paid search
ranking and/or AdWords mechanisms.”  While Plaintiff never actually
states what violation of the Lanham Act he is attempting to plead, the
allegations and his filings in this matter make clear he is alleging a claim
under section 43(a) (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)) of the Lanham Act.  “Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act provides two general theories of liability: (1)
false representations regarding the origin, endorsement, or association of
goods or services through the wrongful use of another's distinctive mark,
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name, trade dress, or other device (“false endorsement” or “false
association”); and (2) false representations in advertising concerning the
quality of services or goods (“false advertising”).”  Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc.,
651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 880 (E.D. Wis. 2009).  Plaintiff’s claims are
consistent with the first theory of liability. 
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff must establish he
has standing under the Lanham Act.  Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 623 F.3d
436, 438 (7th Cir. 2010).  Judge Bernthal, in his Report and
Recommendation, concluded that Plaintiff does not have a commercial
interest in his name, and therefore lacks standing.  This Court agrees
with Judge Bernthal and his Report and Recommendation.
“[S]tanding to assert a § 43 claim is limited to a ‘purely commercial
class of plaintiffs.’” Id. at 439 (quoting Berni v. Int. Gourmet Rest. of
Am., 838 F.2d 642, 648 (2d Cir.1988)).  Plaintiff has simply made
conclusory allegations that he has a commercial interest in his
professional reputation.  In Stayart, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that she had a commercial interest in her
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name because of her extensive activities, including humanitarian efforts. 
Stayart, 623 F.3d at 439.  In doing so, the court stated that “the good
name that a person garners in such altruistic feats is not what § 43 of the
Lanham Act protects:  it ‘is a private remedy for a commercial plaintiff
who meets the burden of proving that its commercial interests have been
harmed by a competitor.’” Id. (citation omitted).  Similarly, Plaintiff’s
individual reputation in the insurance industry is not the commercial
interest the Lanham Act seeks to protect.  Therefore, Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring a claim under the Lanham Act.
e.  Count VIII - Intentional Interference with Current and 
Prospective Economic Advantage
Count VIII is a claim against all Defendants for intentional
interference with current and prospective economic advantage.  Plaintiff
attached a report to the Second Amended Complaint which indicates
that 75% of hiring managers or recruiters use the Internet as part of their
review of candidates/applicants.  According to Plaintiff, the most
common method of research is using a search engine, like Yahoo, Google,
or Microsoft’s Bing.  Plaintiff again alleges he has been “blacklisted”
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based upon the online availability of the documents related to his
litigation against his former employer.  Plaintiff claims that Defendants
should reasonably have been able to anticipate “these adverse
employment actions.”
Under Illinois law, the elements of a claim for tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage or business relationship are: (1) the
existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy; (2) the
defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's relationship or expectancy; (3) an
intentional and unjustified interference by the defendant inducing or
causing a breach or termination of the expectancy; and (4) damages to
plaintiff resulting from such interference.  Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel,
172 Ill.2d 399, 406-07 (Ill. 1996).  “A plaintiff states a cause of action
only if he alleges a business expectancy with a specific third party as well
as action by the defendant directed towards that third party.”  Associated
Underwriters of America Agency, Inc. v. McCarthy, 356 Ill. App. 3d
1010, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
Here, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not state a claim
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for this tort.  First, Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a valid
business relationship or expectancy.  See Buchanan v. Serbin Fashions,
Inc., 698 F. Supp. 731, 734 (N.D. Ill 1988) (rejecting claim that prospect
of receiving job offer constitutes a sufficient expectancy); Werblood v.
Columbia College, 180 Ill. App. 3d 967 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (the
plaintiff's expectation of a renewal of her current college employment
contract was not sufficient to support a cause of action for intentional
interference, even though officials of her college had assured her that her
employment there was secure).  Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that
Defendants had knowledge of Plaintiff's alleged business relationship or
expectancy.  Nor has he alleged an intentional and unjustified
interference by Defendants which induced or caused a breach or
termination of the business relationship or expectancy.  Finally, Plaintiff
has not met the requirement, as stated in McCarthy,  that he allege a
business expectancy with a specific third party as well as action by the
Defendants directed towards that third party.  Therefore, Plaintiff has
not stated a claim for intentional interference with current and
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prospective economic advantage in Count VIII.
f.  Count IX - Unjust Enrichment/Civil Conspiracy
In Count IX, Plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy
against all Defendants.  In Count IX, Plaintiff repeats the  allegations he
has set forth in his other claims.  Additionally, he alleges Defendants
“have acted individually, and/or in concert, by the actions of two or more
persons in conspiracy as to their actions.” 
“To establish an unjust enrichment claim under Illinois common
law, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant has ‘unjustly retained a
benefit to the plaintiff's detriment’ and (2) the defendant's ‘retention of
the benefit violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and
good conscience.’” Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 656 F. Supp. 2d 825, 834
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (citation omitted).  “For a cause of action based on a
theory of unjust enrichment to exist, there must be an independent basis
that establishes a duty on the part of the defendant to act and the
defendant must have failed to abide by that duty.”  Martis v. Grinnell
Mut. Reinsurance Co., 388 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
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Plaintiff cannot state a claim because there was no independent basis
that established a duty on Defendants to act.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s
unjust enrichment claim cannot stand on allegations that Defendants
were unjustly enriched by providing electronic access to public case
information.  Defendants are not “retaining a benefit” to Plaintiff’s
detriment just because they are selling electronic access to public
information and Plaintiff does not like the information contained in
those public documents.
“Under Illinois law, the ‘elements of civil conspiracy are: (1) a
combination of two or more persons, (2) for the purpose of
accomplishing by some concerted action either an unlawful purpose or a
lawful purpose by unlawful means, (3) in the furtherance of which one of
the conspirators committed an overt tortious or unlawful act.”  Id. at
836.  Civil conspiracy is not an independent tort, rather there must be an
independent cause of action underlying a civil conspiracy claim.  Id. 
Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of establishing the last two elements of
this claim.  Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish that Defendants
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worked together to accomplish an action that had an unlawful purpose or
a lawful purpose by unlawful means in the furtherance of which one of
the conspirators committed an overt tortious or unlawful act.
g.  Count X - RICO
Count X of the Second Amended Complaint purports to allege a
RICO violation.  This Count fails to state a RICO claim as there are no
allegations that any of the Defendants were involved in a “racketeering
activity” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 or that they engaged in any of
the prohibited activities enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
2.  Defendants Microsoft’s and Yahoo! Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings is Granted
Judge Bernthal recommended that Microsoft’s and Yahoo! Inc.’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings2 on Counts III, IV, VIII, IX, and
X of the Second Amended Complaint be granted.  Judge Bernthal
concluded that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the First Amendment
because reproducing and selling public information obtained in the form
2 A Corrected Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings that included Count VI
was filed later.
Page 21 of  29
of judicial opinions issued in connection with a public court proceeding
cannot give rise to liability.  See Rubin v. City of Berwyn, 553 F. Supp.
476, 479 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (stating “the right to sell and disseminate
public information is protected by the First Amendment”).  Judge
Bernthal also concluded that Plaintiff’s state law claims, which Judge
Bernthal found are more akin to defamation and various privacy torts,
are barred by § 230 of the CDA.
a.  The First Amendment Bars Plaintiff’s Claims
All of Plaintiff’s claims are based upon the following core 
allegations.  Plaintiff was involved in litigation against his former
employer.  A search of Plaintiff’s name on Defendants’ websites results in
links to copies of filings and court rulings in the Plaintiff’s case against 
his former employer.  Potential employers are doing searches of Plaintiff’s
name and have seen this information.  Plaintiff has been “blacklisted”
and has lost out on several potential job opportunities because of this.
However, “the First Amendment creates a privilege to publish
matters contained in public records even if publication would offend the
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sensibilities of a reasonable person.” Haynes v. Alred A. Knopf, Inc., 8
F.3d 1222, 1231-32 (7th Cir. 1993).  Moreover, “the First Amendment
greatly circumscribes the right even of a private figure to obtain damages
for the publication of newsworthy facts about him, even when they are
facts of a kind that people want very much to conceal.”  Id. at 1232.  As
stated, all of Plaintiff’s allegations rest on the premise that Defendants’
websites provide links to information that is in the public record. 
Plaintiff cannot show he is plausibly entitled to relief.  Therefore,
judgment on the pleadings is appropriate.
b.  Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
Judge Bernthal, in his Report and Recommendation, also concludes
that Plaintiff’s state law claims are really variations of defamation and
invasion of privacy claims that are barred by § 230 of the CDA.  In
enacting the CDA, Congress sought to “promote the continued
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media,” and to “preserve the vibrant and competitive
free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
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computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b). 
Section 230 of the CDA provides, in part, that (1) "[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider" and (2) "[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability
may be imposed under any State or local rule that is inconsistent with
this section."  47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1) & (e)(3).
The language of § 230 sets three limits on the “immunity”3
provided.  First, the “immunity” is available only to a “provider or user of
an interactive computer service.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  The CDA
defines the term "interactive computer service" as "any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server."  47 U.S.C. §
3 The Seventh Circuit has noted that the statutory text of § 230(c)(1) does not
mention “immunity” or any synonym, and explained “why § 230(c) as a whole
cannot be understood as a prohibition of civil liability for web-site operators and
other online contents.”  Chicago Laywers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Doe v. GTE
Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003)
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230(f)(2).  Second, “immunity” is only available for liability based on the
defendant having acted as a “publisher or speaker.”  47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1).  Finally, “immunity” can be claimed only with respect to
“information provided by another information content provider.”  47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).   An "information content provider" is "any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service."  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation closely
and agrees with the conclusions therein that § 230 bars many of
Plaintiff’s claims in the Second Amended Complaint.  However, the
Court notes that nothing in § 230 shall be construed to (1) impair the
enforcement of any Federal criminal statute or (2) limit or expand any
law pertaining to intellectual property.  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) &(2). 
Therefore, the Court questions whether § 230 would serve to bar
Plaintiff’s Lanham Act, Right of Publicity Act, and RICO claims.
First, the Lanham Act claim would most certainly be considered an
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intellectual property claim.  See Stayart, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 885 (stating
if the Plaintiff has stated a claim for false endorsement under the Lanham
Act, the defendant would not be immune from liability for those claims
because such a claim would probably be considered an intellectual
property claim).  Moreover, Plaintiff’s commercial misappropriation
claims, which this Court has treated as claims under the Right of
Publicity Act, would also likely be considered intellectual property claims
and would therefore not be barred by the § 230 of the CDA.  See id. at
287-88 (stating that a right-to-publicity claim is generally considered an
intellectual property claim and recognizing the disagreement among
various federal courts regarding the scope of the intellectual property
exception in § 230(e)(2)).
Finally, it is unclear whether § 230 would bar a RICO claim.  This
Court has found no caselaw on the issue.  As stated, “[n]othing in [§
230] shall be construed to impair the enforcement of . . .  any other
Federal criminal statute.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1).  RICO provides for
both civil and criminal enforcement.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (setting forth
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RICO’s criminal penalties) and 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (setting forth RICO’s
civil remedies).  However, even claims brought pursuant to the civil
enforcement provision of RICO may only be brought by the Attorney
General or a person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b), (c).  Section 
1962 sets forth the activities prohibited by RICO, all of which are
“unlawful.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 1962.  Also of note, the RICO statute
located in Title 18 of the United States Code, which is entitled “Crimes
and Criminal Procedure.”  Therefore, arguably, § 230 of the CDA may
not be used to bar a civil RICO claim because that would impair the
enforcement of a Federal criminal statute.
However, the Court need not resolve these issues as the Court has
already determined that Plaintiff has not stated a claim under any of the
Counts he alleged in his Second Amended Complaint.  More
importantly, the Court concluded the First Amendment bars all of
Plaintiff’s claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objections to the
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Report and Recommendation are OVERRULED and Judge Bernthal’s
Report and Recommendation (d/e 39) is ADOPTED.  Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss (d/e 16, d/e 18, and d/e 27) are GRANTED. 
Additionally, Defendants Microsoft’s and Yahoo! Inc.’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (d/e 22) is GRANTED.  Because all of
Plaintiff’s claims are based on providing information that is in the public
record, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the First Amendment and any
amendment of the Second Amended Complaint would be fruitless. 
Therefore, the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.  This ruling renders moot both (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction against Acton and Versuslaw (d/e 10) because
there is no likelihood of success on the merits, and (2) Microsoft’s and
Yahoo’s Corrected Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (d/e 38)
because Count VI has been dismissed with prejudice and the First
Amendment bars such a claim.  Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (d/e 10) and Defendants Microsoft’s and Yahoo’s
Corrected Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (d/e 38) are DENIED
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AS MOOT.  This case is CLOSED.
IT IS THEREFORE SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: August 2, 2012.
FOR THE COURT:
               s/ Sue E. Myerscough            
   SUE E. MYERSCOUGH  
UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE
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